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For some time now it has been fairly regular for commentators on Marx 
to take his criticisms of Hegel at their face value, without doing much to 
offer challenges to those criticisms. The recent renaissance in Hegel studies 
has led to a change of outlook on this matter. As philosophers are reading 
Hegel more closely many are finding that Marx's reading of Hegel is 
significantly deficient on a number of issues. Marx's glosses have helped to 
foster some of the myths about Hegel's views that were for a long while 
prevalent, and that now and again are still found in a few commentators. 
Combatting these myths requires going to their source. I would like to 
confront one myth in particular, the idea that for Hegel human alienation 
is inevitable and insurmountable, and to examine Marx's claims about this, 
especially as they are presented by C. J . Arthur in his book Dialectics of 
Labour.11 I use Arthur's commentary because I think his is a good example of 
an approach that takes Marx's views on Hegel uncritically. 
Arthur's book, which is a detailed study of Marx's 'Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844/ attempts to articulate the unity of 
these writings by showing how through the concept of human labour Marx 
was able to synthesize premises from German (Hegel's) philosophy, 
English political economy, and French socialism. The author argues that 
all the sections of the 1844 manuscripts are essential to the theory of 
alienation and that they continue to be of importance for Marx's later 
mature writings in political economy. 
As the subtitle of the book indicates, of central concern is the 
relationship of Marx's view of labour to Hegel's philosophy, and Part Two, 
which is entitled The Critique of Hegel,' comprises fully a third of the 
text. The discussion of Marx and Hegel is undoubtedly the most 
provocative aspect of this work, and while it does very well at explicating 
Marx's view of Hegel and the influences of the latter on the former, it does 
little if anything in the way of raising critical questions about Marx's 
interpretation and critique of Hegel's dialectical philosophy. As I will 
argue, there are some important misinterpretations of Hegel by Marx on the 
subject of alienation that Arthur fails to discern in the critique of Hegel. 
Before turning to this argument, I will summarize the first part of the book 
which discusses Marx on alienation. 
Part One, entitled 'Marx's Theory of Alienation,' has three chapters 
devoted, respectively, to 'Alienated Labour/ 'Private Property,' and 
1 C. J . Arthur, Dialectics of Labour: Marx and his Relation to Hegel 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986). 
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'Communism.' Corresponding to these topics are three central claims made 
by the author concerning Marx's views: 1) that while in 1844 Marx 'for the 
first time attributes ontological significance to productive activity,"2 which 
serves as the 'mediation' between man and nature, yet under capitalism 
labour is identical to alienated or estranged labour; 2) that, in contrast to 
pre-capitalist forms, private property under capitalism is the result, and 
not the basic cause, of alienated labour since it is under the system of wage 
labour that the 'active alienation of labour from itself becomes 
dramatized; and 3) that communism is not merely the abolition of private 
property but its 'positive supersession' as reappropriation of the human 
essence by taking possession of the productive forces, but still is not yet 
'self-transcending historical practice.'3 
1. According to Arthur, the categories of 'productive activity* and 
'labour' in Marx should be kept distinct in order to avoid confusion about 
Marx's ontology, for it is the former term, and not the latter, which refers 
consistently to the generic relation of mediation in the relationship 
'man-activity-nature.' On the human side of this relation productive 
activity results in the 'development of a wealth of needs,' and on the 
nature side the 'development of the productive forces.' However, Marx 
tends to equate the term 'labour' with labor under capitalism—wage-
labour—which is estranged labor and, therefore, a corrupted or diminished 
form of generic human activity due to the 'double' alienation of 'man from 
man' and 'man from nature.' Borrowing from Istvan Mezaros, Arthur 
distinguishes between two levels of mediation: a) first order mediation 
which is ontologically basic as the generic essence of human objectification 
and b) second order mediations which are historically specific and tend to 
manifest estrangement where original unity in the relation 'man-
activity-nature' is lost. The second level of mediation is built upon the 
first as a sort of 'conceptual inflection' whereby what is originally the 
generic activity of objectification becomes alienation. For Arthur this 
distinction is important for seeing both the 'objective necessity of a 
historical supersession* of alienation (since otherwise a collapsing of the 
distinction leads to a view of the essentiality of certain historical 
phenomena, e.g., private property and exchange) and the inevitability of 
alienation.4 
In part, Arthur's concern here is with Marx's terminology in which 
'labour' is often synonymous with 'wage-labour' and with 'estranged 
labour.' There is no question that in the Manuscripts Marx uses 'labour' in 
such a shorthand way and this has been recognized by other commentators. 
However, in Capital Marx uses 'labour' in the positive generic sense, as a 
2 Arthur, Dialectics of Labour, p. 5. 
3 Dialectics of Labour, p. 25. 
4 Dialectics of Labour, p. 41. 
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first order and not second order mediation, and Arthur's concern is that, if 
the ambiguity in Marx's use of 'labour' is not noted, misunderstandings 
about the two levels of mediation could occur. He concludes that generally 
Marx defines 'labour' negatively and equates it with alienating activity 
rather than with free self-activity. As we will see later, this concept of 
human activity is important for contrasting Marx's views on alienation 
with those of Hegel. 
2. In his discussion of private property in Marx's Manuscripts Arthur 
attempts to clarify another possible source of confusion having to do with 
Marx's claims that alienation is due to the subordination of labour to 
private property and yet that private property is not the cause but the 
consequence of alienated labour. The problem apparently is that a reader 
might find an inconsistency in Marx's account if the dynamics of the rela-
tion between private property and alienated labour under capitalism are 
not properly understood. First, property is in any case a human institution 
and creation and has its origins in the human activity of appropriation—it 
does not make its appearance sui generis. Second, capitalist private 
property is the direct result of the accumulation of value produced by wage 
labour. Although here Marx has not yet developed the theory of surplus 
value, his views on property are consistent with his ontology of productive 
activity as the source of all objectification. In pre-capitalist formations, 
landed property may well be, from a temporal perspective, the power 
behind the exploitation of certain forms of labour with no 'internal 
economic dialectic' between the two, but under capitalism fully developed 
private property is freed of its political determinations and thus subject to 
'purely economic movement' in relation to labour. This corresponds to the 
change from personal relations of dependency to common dependence on 
impersonal relations created by the capitalist market which operated on 
the basis of alienated labour. Arthur's conclusion is that '[pjrivate 
property, originally other than labour, becomes in practice labour's own 
other, private property as alienated labour. Private property is unmasked 
as itself a structure of alienation, rather than the (apparently external) 
cause of estrangement.'5 
Again, the upshot of Arthur's discussions thus far is the fundamental 
character of human productive activity, even when it undergoes various 
historical transmutations. Moreover, the necessary supersession of 
alienation is grounded in the contradiction internal to private property 
under capitalism, a contradiction analyzable as the unity in opposition of 
labour and capital, a second order phenomenon which violates the first 
order essential relation between productive activity and its object. 
Moreover, 'Only if labour is grasped as the overriding moment in the 
alienated labour/private property complex can the conditions of a real 
5 Dialectics of Labour, pp. 5-19. 
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transcendence of estrangement be established.'6 What this seems to mean is 
not only that the power of overcoming alienation—just as the ability to 
establish it—is in the hands of human actors but also that the 
inevitability of the overcoming of alienation is in a way dictated by the 
necessity of the ultimate predominance of the first order mediation over 
estranged second order mediations. Put simply, the ontology of human pro-
ductive activity itself dictates the return to its essential nonalienated 
unity. 
3. As Arthur understands it, for the Marx of the Manuscripts communism 
is not a narrow political program but rather an essential response to 
alienation. 'It has fundamental ontological significance as the gateway to 
the reappropriation by the community of the human essence.*7 Clearly, 
since private property is the expression of alienation under capitalism, 
communism must in some way supersede private property. However, there 
are two important issues here. 
First, although alienation itself cannot be considered historically 
necessary without reducing second order mediations to first order ones, 
there is historical necessity to the stages of productive development, and 
especially to the levels of development of productive forces under 
capitalism. Thus, the overcoming of property cannot be construed as a 
simple return to the primitive past prior, to the occurrence of alienating 
divisions of labour. But this means that Marx must have a positive as well 
as negative conception of property, which brings us beyond private 
property without regressing backwards in history. Accordingly, in contrast 
to crude egalitarian communism which focusses merely on equality of 
distribution of goods and neglects individual differences (where all are 
labourers simpliciter), communism as the 'positive supersession of private 
property as human self-estrangement' must also preserve the 'human 
wealth' and achievements that have been created historically. In short, 
communism as the 'negation of the negation' (private property being the 
first negation) is forward, not backward, looking and develops concretely 
and immanently out of capitalism, as well as in opposition to it. 
Second, according to Marx, '[cjommunism is the necessary shape and the 
dynamic principle of the immediate future, but communism itself is not as 
such the goal of human development-the shape of human society.'8 What 
does this mean? According to Arthur, for Marx the 'goal of human 
development' lies beyond communism because it transcends the 'opposition 
to private property,' by which communism is still apparently 'infected by 
its opposite.' In contrast, 'socialism as 'positive humanism' stands on the 
ground of the essential relations of man to himself and to nature. It does not 
6 Dialectics of Labour, p. 25. 
7 Dialectics of Labour, p. 33. 
8 Dialectics of Labour, p. 35. 
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require to be perpetually mediated through its understanding of itself as 
the opposite of private property, although this mediation is a historically 
necessary stage.'9 In effect, the ultimate human goal is fully positive, the 
retrieval of humanity's ontological essence, the non-alienated unity of 
man-activity-nature. 
As one can see, Arthurs efforts seem to be well directed in his focussing 
on clarification of possible ambiguities or inconsistencies in Marx's 
treatment of labour, private property, and communism. We get not a 
critical exposition and interpretation but one which attempts simply to 
read Marx intelligibly and coherently. 
In Part Two of his book, The Critique of Hegel,' Arthur attempts to 
delineate precisely the theoretical relationship between Marx and Hegel, 
and specifically to articulate the ways in which Marx appropriates from 
Hegel and those in which he significantly departs from Hegel. The 
themes of this discussion are labour, alienation, dialectic, and the 
influence of Hegel's Phenomenoloay of Spirit. Just as in the first part, here 
Arthur does a very good job of explaining Marx's views, but, as we will see, 
the care and effort which was put into a coherent reading of Marx is 
somewhat missing when it comes to interpreting Hegel. 
In Chapter 5, on 'Hegel's Phenomenology,' Arthur says that for Marx 
'Hegel's strength is precisely that he gives full recognition to the problem 
of estrangement. His weakness is that, in spite of the wealth of social and 
historical material treated, he considers it ultimately as a problem of 
consciousness.''10 Arthur's discussion of the Phenomenology is aimed at 
providing a context for this assessment. Right off, there is the issue of 
terminology regarding the translation of Hegel's Entausserung.' Following 
Georg Lukacs, Arthur thinks that 'alienation' is a better English 
translation than 'externalization,' especially since with the latter we are 
likely to be confused with 'objectification' (Vergegenstandlishung). The 
difference, broadly, is that while Entausseruna carries the sense of 'posited 
as objective/ it also connotes relinquishment, such that an objectivity is set 
up from which the subject is estranged. Enfremdung is quite unambiguous, 
and may be rendered as 'estrangement'.'11 
In my view, there are two reasons for being uneasy with this handling 
of semantics. First, instead of considering Hegel's own usage on its own 
terms the strategy appears to be to make Hegel speak so that Marx, who 
explicitly distinguishes objectification from alienation, will not sound 
confused; and second, the similarity between 'Entausserung' and 
'Entfremdung' seems to be overdone here, since to 'relinquish,' 'dispose of/ 
9 Quoted by Arthur on p. 38 from Karl Marx, Collected Works, Vol. 3 
(London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1975), p. 306. 
1 0 Dialectics of Labour, p. 38. 
1 1 Dialectics of Labour, p. 49. 
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'divest/ 'part with,' or 'discard' (entaussern) does not necessarily imply 
the negative connotation of to 'estrange' or to 'alienate' (entfremden). Of 
course, for someone already familiar with Marx's critique of Hegel, this 
way of understanding the terminology is consistent with Marx's usage and 
will also facilitate reading Hegel in the way Marx does. Despite the fact 
that in his appendix Arthur recognizes that with 'alienation of property' 
one can use 'Entausserung' but not 'Entfremdung,' and generally that the 
latter term is of narrower application, he nonetheless concludes that 
'(wlith Hegel's Phenomenology it is tempting to suggest that Entfremdung 
stands to Entausserung as phenomenological result to the active process of 
spirit's positing itself in otherness. This would conform with Marx's gloss: 
'Entfremdung...constitutes the real interest of Entausserung.'"12 If nothing 
else, this certainly begs the question of the correctness of Marx's reading of 
Hegel. 
Arthur tells us that Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit can be read as a 
sort of epistemological Bildungsroman of spirit where the determination of 
the untruth of various perspectives involves not just negative refutations 
but simultaneously the discovery of the grounds for progress in knowing, a 
development which is possible only because it takes place immanently to 
consciousness. Spirit reaches absolute knowledge when in grasping its own 
essence it transcends all alien positings of the object of knowledge. 
However, there is a problem in the way that Hegel construes the 
relationship of knowledge to its object. 'More particularly, the problem is: 
how can consciousness claim to know its object (Gegenstand) when the latter 
is posited as other than i t ? 1 3 The solution for Hegel must be that 
'consciousness becomes more and more aware that it is its own activity that 
constitutes the object as an object of knowledge. The very distinction be-
tween knowledge and its object is drawn from the point of view of 
consciousness and is hence to be construed as a distinction falling within 
consciousness i t se l f . ' 1 4 The fundamental significance of the 
Phenomenology, therefore, along with the implications for Marx's 
appropriation and critique of Hegel, are: first, the alienation experienced 
by spirit in the otherness of its object, as well as the transcending of this 
alienation through overcoming of this otherness, is understood as the 
active self-determination of spirit and not the result of passive submission 
to some external process; second, alienation has a positive meaning for self-
consciousness since it involves the positing of spirit as objective and then 
recognizing this objectivity as spirit's own achievement. Thus, the 
necessity of self-alienation which leads to a 'positing through negating.'1 5 
1 2 Dialectics of Labour, p. 50. 
1 3 Quoted by Arthur on p. 148 from Marx, Collected Works, p. 331. 
1 4 Dialectics of Labour, p. 52. 
1 5 Dialectics of Labour, p. 52. 
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Moreover, the 'labour of the negative' eventually finds a 'resting place1 
with the absolute knowledge that culminates the Phenomenology. 
Arthur reminds us that Marx's critical appropriation of Hegel's 
Phenomenology is inspired partly by Ludwig Feuerbach, and in particular 
by the method of inversion by which Hegel's Bildungsroman of spirit is 
anthropomorphized such that spiritual activity is read as the activity of 
human labour. While Marx is attracted to the 'producing principle' in 
Hegel, and the idea that self-estrangement leads to its overcoming, yet, 
according to Arthur, Marx discovers 'four mistakes' in Hegel: '(a) the 
reduction of man to self-consciousness and activity to spiritual labour; (b) 
the identification of objectivity with estrangement; (c) the claim that 
spirit (read 'man') is 'at home in its other-being as such;' (d) the failure to 
go beyond the 'negation of the negation' to the self-sustaining positive.'1 6 
There is a single thread running through these mistakes and it goes 
something like this. Because Hegel as 'idealist' identifies the human 
essence with self-consciousness, all human estrangement is nothing but the 
estrangement of self-consciousness and objectivity is merely an abstraction 
posited by consciousness only to be taken back into itself. The reconciliation 
achieved by self-consciousness does not involve any practical 
transformation of objectivity but is merely a 'change of attitude' resulting 
from the realization by consciousness that the alienated objectivity is 
really only its own product. The basic idea is that the process of alienation 
(Entausserung) and overcoming of alienation is purely immanent to 
self-consciousness and therefore is nothing but an abstract activity that is 
inherently uncritical and conservative, despite the fact that it cannot 
surpass negativity. In contrast, with Marx, who views human labour as 
material rather than spiritual, alienation occurs in the context of an 
already existing external nature, and the estranged product of human 
labour must not just be recognized as such, or reinterpreted philosophically, 
but must be reappropriated through a practical solution, i.e., revolutionary 
practice which reconstitutes reality and sets it on a new basis—the 
'self-sustaining positive.' 
Without doubt, much of this interpretation of Hegel, given by Marx 
and elaborated by Arthur, hangs on the reading of Hegel's use of 
'Entausserung.' Again, Arthur follows Lukacs in rendering 'Entausserung' as 
both 'alienation' or 'estrangement' so that the conclusion that Hegel 
equates objectivity with estrangement (where the end result stands opposed 
to spirit), or objectification with alienation (where the act of 
externalization is experienced as inherently alienating), might appear 
obvious. Moreover, while we have Marx agreeing with Hegel that 
objectification through labour and the overcoming of alienation is 
necessary, there is a disagreement over the necessity of alienation itself, 
for according to Marx estrangement is not intrinsic to the ontological 
16 Dialectics of Labour, p. 56. 
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structure of labour itself but is only an historical manifestation that can 
and will be transcended eventually. Since for Hegel externalization is 
inherently alienating, all historical objectifications must necessarily 
involve estrangement, and the ultimate retrieval of otherness by spirit can 
only occur in the abstract domain of philosophical speculative thought. 
The practical result of Hegel's philosophical reconciliation is his 
conservative accommodation with private property, the state, and 
religion. Hegel shares the uncritical standpoint of modern political 
economy from which alienation is preserved rather than abolished. 
In a short appendix to Chapter 6 Arthur raises the question, 'is Marx 
fair to Hegel'? He makes reference to a work by Gilian Rose entitled Hegel 
Contra Sociology where it is argued that Marx distorts Hegel's 
Phenomenology by giving it a 'Fichtean reading.' Arthur's response to this 
is that Marx sees an 'antagonistic unity' in Hegel between Spinoza's 
substance and Rente's self-consciousness, and in any case 'Marx's point is 
that where the absolute is concerned, the relation to the object is grasped 
by Hegel ultimately as not a really objective relation.' 1 7 Moreover, it 
would seem, in Arthur's view, that Hegel's view of the positing by 
consciousness is, in fact, very Fichtean. 
Although Arthur claims that his concern with Hegel in this book is 
with how Marx saw him and not with defending Marx's reading, he does 
believe that the 'general thrust* of Marx's view is correct 1 8 Indeed, Arthur 
actually goes significantly further than this statement would suggest, for 
subsequently in later chapters he provides a critique of Hegel on 
wage-labour (Chapter 8) and in Part Three a quite favorable overall 
assessment of Marx (Chapter 10). The only significant criticism that 
Arthur makes of Marx is that the latter may have been too Hegelian in 
seeing self-mediation as the solution to the 'riddle of history' and too 
Feuerbachian in his view of the 'complete unity in essence of man with 
nature' which resulted in a failure to appreciate the 'recalcitrance of 
nature to human use.' 1 9 Ultimately, these sources led Marx to be overly 
optimistic about the 'abolition of labour' in the future society, where free 
activity seems to supplant not only private property and alienation, but 
the realm of material necessity as well. Marx seems to fail to see, at least 
in a consistent way, that freedom and material necessity must be understood 
as dialectically related and that freedom is never fully achieved at any 
point in history, but must continually be 'won and re-won in the dialectic of 
history.*20 
Arthur's conclusion here about Marx is somewhat curious, for it is 
precisely the sort of response an Hegelian would make in acknowledging 
1 7 Dialectics of Labour, p. 60. 
1 8 Dialectics of Labour, p. 75. 
1 9 Dialectics of Labour, p. 74. 
2 0 Dialectics of Labour, p. 138. 
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that because of the character of temporal finitude the 'cunning of reason' 
never ceases in history. But I doubt that Arthur would understand how an 
Hegelian could hold this view given his, and Marx's, interpretation of the 
role of the 'absolute' in Hegel. 
It seems that there is a failure here to recognize that Marx is not just 
rhetorically unfair to Hegel at times but that he misinterprets Hegel in 
fundamental ways. In particular, the distinction between Absolute Spirit 
and the Absolute Idea is not kept straight, with the consequence that the 
relation between history and logic in Hegel is confused. Georg Lukacs, upon 
whom Arthur relies heavily, is notorious for reinforcing the Marxist 
reading of Hegel's Phenomenology as a simple working out of logical 
categories. Also, the idea that the absolute, be it Idea or Spirit, is an 
identity-in-difference, and not a simple identity, is often overlooked or not 
considered carefully. Finally, there is a tendency in Marx and his 
followers to take the concept of self-consciousness in Hegel's 
Phenomenology as a basically psychological phenomenon, supporting the 
conclusion that Hegel as idealist must either reject or underplay the role of 
independent external reality in his view of historical development. In 
failing to see that, on the one hand, self-consciousness is not merely a 
mental state for Hegel but a relation in the world and, on the other, that 
the Phenomenology is concerned with what knowing is and not with 
metaphysical being or existence, Hegel's phenomenological project is 
twisted and distorted. 
I have already commented on the issue of Hegel's terminology and at 
this point will only indicate that the equation of Entausserung with 
estrangement (Entfremdung ) is surely a mistake. As Louis Dupre has 
convincingly argued, in Hegel alienation occurs not simply because of the 
encounter with otherness in the act of externalization but due to the lack of 
recognition of the self in the other. 2 1 'Alienation consists in the mind's 
inability to recognize itself in an externalization which it nevertheless 
knows to be its own. ' 2 2 Prior to the emergence of spirit in the 
Phenomenology, the Entfremdung of the 'unhappy consciousness' is -
overcome precisely through the Entausserung of self-consciousness whereby 
the will is affirmed as universal.23 Subsequent to the appearance of spirit, 
the term 'alienation' (Entausseruna) attains its full meaning as a problem 
of adequate externalization in the degree of self-recognition in the object, 
and not of the distinctness per se of the object. 
2 1 L. Dupre, 'Hegel's Concept of Alienation and Marx's Reinterpretation of 
It,' Hegel Studien, Bd. 7 (1972), 217-236. 
2 2 Dupre, 'Hegel's Concept of Alienation and Marx's Reinterpretation of It,' 
p. 218. 
2 3 Dupre, 'Hegel's Concept of Alienation and Marx's Reinterpretation of It,' 
p. 219. 
84 AUSLEGUNG 
According to Dupre, Marx's concept of alienation is heavily under the 
influence of Feuerbach who understood religious and philosophical 
alienation to involve the projecting of an infinite divine Other as the 
ground of man. Marx, for example, applies this meaning in his opposition to 
Hegel with a critique of the state and its 'mystifying' institutions. 
The consequences of Marx's usage is that he attributes to Hegel the 
identification of alienation with objectification and the overcoming of 
alienation with the elimination of objectivity.24 However, for Dupre this 
interpretation is 'patently false' since Hegel recognizes that it is in the 
interaction between consciousness and the world, not the dissolving of the 
world in consciousness, that consciousness becomes actual. The overcoming 
of alienation consists in the fact that consciousness no longer remains s 
stranger to what it could originally conceive only as external to itself. 1 2 5 
(my emphasis) 
Dupre also recognizes that there are incohcrencies in Marx's theory of 
objectivity, but, unlike Arthur who thinks that Marx does not take the 
otherness of nature seriously enough, Dupre believes that Marx's mistake is 
in defining objectivity as 'independent' of man. 2 6 Naturally, this raises 
the issue of the proper conception of the relationship 'man-activity-nature' 
and I suspect that an appropriate Hegelian response to Marx's ontology of 
productive activity is to reassert the primacy of consciousness over 
material labour, since the human being cannot act upon the world until he 
or she has made some sort of interpretation of it, so as to provide the goals 
and meaning of the action. 
The difficulty with the quasi-naturalistic ontology that underlies 
Marx's view of objectification is that it neglects the epistemological 
context of action and in doing so takes the relation of subject to object as 
unproblematic. The traditional philosophical questions about the 
possibility of knowledge simply do not figure into Marx's project, and 
indeed one gathers that for Marx these are largely pseudo-questions 
generating pseudoproblems. Also, in casting reason in a purely instrumental 
mode Marx has reduced the symbolic dimension of action to a merely 
secondary epiphenomenal-like status. This goes along with a reductionist 
tendency in Marx's criterion of concrete activity in making material 
productive activity the paradigm of concreteness. Not surprisingly, one of 
the legacies of Marx for later Marxism has been either the ignoring or 
oversimplifying of the perennial philosophical issue of the ground of 
knowledge and meaning. 
2 4 Dupre, 'Hegel's Concept of Alienation and Marx's Reinterpretation of It,' 
p. 233. 
2 5 Dupre, 'Hegel's Concept of Alienation and Marx's Reinterpretation of It,' 
p. 233. 
2 6 Dupre, 'Hegel's Concept of Alienation and Marx's Reinterpretation of It,' 
pp. 234-35. 
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Overall, C. J. Arthur provides us with a very accurate understanding of 
Marx's Paris Manuscripts, and he makes a valiant effort at dispelling 
certain 'myths' about Marx, e.g., the idea that he was influenced by 
Hegel's dialectic of lordship and bondage. However, the clarity and 
cogency of his exposition and interpretation does not remove the flawed 
character of Marx's early philosophy. It may well be that, since Marx had 
already committed himself in 1843 to the overcoming of philosophy in 
practice, he inevitably would be somewhat of a careless philosopher and 
more a zealous revolutionary trying to force theory into an ideological 
mold. In any case, there is a certain abstractness and dogmatism to the 
Paris Manuscripts that many commentators have failed to recognize, with 
the consequence that in simply taking Marx as an authoritative source some 
misconceptions about Hegel's views have been perpetuated. 
